Introduction
Many a syllabus for an undergraduate course includes discussion of "Reid's Brave Officer". Here is Reid's description of the example:
(1) Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life; suppose, also, which must be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. (EIP 276) The example, we tell our undergraduates, serves to illustrate an objection to Locke's theory of personal identity. We then go on to explain ways in which Locke's theory might be revised in order to accommodate the example and other puzzling examples that might be constructed in its wake. How would we revise the theory, for instance, to explain the case in which the general remembers being flogged as does the officer, but the general cannot remember his military exploits? By asking and answering questions of this kind we trace a line of philosophical thought on the nature of personal identity that travels from Locke to Reid to Quinton to Grice and on to Parfit. It's a tidy story.
Despite the fact that the Brave Officer example is usually attributed to Reid, who offers the example in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man i , published in 1785, Berkeley scholars have been stridently aware for some time that it was offered much earlier by Berkeley-in Alciphron ii , which was written around 1730. Although Reid spent much of his career trying to refute Berkeley's theory of sensory perception, Berkeley was one of his philosophical heroes, so it is no surprise that Reid should have taken the example from him. In recent years, however, Reid scholars have become aware that not only did Reid make no claim to have thought of the example himself, he attributed it in his manuscripts not to Berkeley, but to his friend George Campbell.
iii This suggests that even if Reid had run across the example while reading Berkeley, he had forgotten that Berkeley offered it by the time he used the example in the Essays on the Intellectual Powers some 40 years later.
Given this history, there does not seem to be much reason for optimism about the prospects for finding anything of interest in those parts of Reid's discussion of Locke's theory of personal identity that can be legitimately attributed to Reid. After all, Reid's discussion of that issue is not remembered for anything but the Brave Officer example, and it does not appear that even the insights contained in that example are to be credited to Reid. This paper, however, uncovers a penetrating criticism of Locke's theory of personal identity that can be found in Reid, a more powerful objection than that contained in the Brave Officer example as usually interpreted. Roughly, the objection is that Locke's theory of personal identity is incapable of accounting for the special unity of the mind. As will be suggested, Reid thinks that we know our minds are unified in this special way from consideration of first-personal awareness of identity between the subject of present thoughts and the subject of past thoughts. But, in addition, we know it from consideration of the nature of the moral sense, and its link to the self-directed faculty of conscience. Reflection on Reid's response to Locke's theory of personal identity, in short, helps us to understand better what, for Reid, the moral sense is supposed to be, and what relation he takes it to bear to other fundamental faculties of the mind, such as the faculty through which we judge identity.
When we see what Reid takes the fundamental problem with Locke's theory to be, we can see what lesson Reid wants us to take from the Brave Officer example. It turns out that it is a very different lesson from the lesson that we teach our students these days to take from it. Reid's Brave Officer is supposed to be an example of a person whose mind is unified in a way that Locke's theory cannot explain. However, as I will show in this paper, Reid would have offered the very same objection, and for the same reasons, to the more complicated "Lockean" theories of personal identity that have been developed in an effort to accommodate the Brave Officer and its variants. In short, the tradition of development of Locke's theory of personal identity that runs through Quinton and Grice and on to Parfit has missed the point of Reid's Brave Officer example; even though the most sophisticated Lockean theories have managed to respond to the letter of the objection, they haven't responded to its spirit, the spirit in which Reid, anyway, offered it. The mind, Reid thought, possesses a kind of unity that entails the inadequacy of analyses of personal identity through appeal to relations among acts of mind.
The usual lesson that is taken from the Brave Officer example is encouraged by the way in which Reid describes its import. After describing the details of the example, he writes, distinctions are between strict identity and not strict, or derived identity, on the one hand, and between continuous and successive existence, on the other. As we will see in the next section, these two distinctions track each other: Reid thinks that things that stand in strict identity relations to themselves necessarily exist continuously and things that stand only in derived identity relations to themselves can exist successively. As we will see in the section to follow, Reid uses this pair of distinctions, together with appeal to the indivisibility of persons, to argue against Locke's theory of personal identity.
Strict and Derived Identity, Continuous and Successive Existence
To get a handle on this pair of distinctions, consider, first, the following remark about the relation of identity:
(3) Identity in general, I take to be a relation between a thing which is known to exist at one time, and a thing which is known to have existed at another time.
(EIP III.4, p. 263)
It is easy to overlook how peculiar this claim is. Reid seems to be precluding the possibility that identity could be a relation between a thing and itself where each of the relata are picked out through appeal to properties possessed at a single time. To see the point, let's use the term "the general" to mean "the person who has the property of sitting in the nursing home and boring his compatriots with stories of his military exploits" and the term "the officer" to mean "the person who has the property of capturing the enemy's flag", where both of these are to be understood de re. The relation of identity does not obtain, Reid seems to think, between the general and the general, although it does obtain between the general and the officer. This is peculiar 6 since, given that he accepts that identity is transitive and symmetrical, he has to admit that identity holds between the general and the general. Locke seems to think that in the first instance the idea of identity is acquired by comparing the idea that we have of a thing existing at one time and the idea of a thing existing at another; we acquire the idea of identity, he thinks, by recognizing that the two ideas pick out one and the same thing. Whether or not it would be possible, we do not in fact, he thinks, acquire the idea of identity by comparing the idea of the general with the idea of the general; we need, also, the idea of the officer. It is far from clear why Locke holds this view. Why can't a person acquire the idea of identity by thinking about the body of which the left hand before him is a part and comparing it to the body of which the right hand before him is a part? Or by comparing the body before him with itself without thinking about it in two different ways? Such questions seem particularly pressing given that Locke uses his criterion for personal identity to specify the conditions under which there is identity in synchronic cases of just this sort (see 7 Essay II.xxvii.17, for instance). Be that as it may, for Locke, once we acquire the idea of the relation of identity-the acquisition of which requires ideas representing a thing at different times-we can recognize that it holds between that which is represented by two ideas representing different but simultaneous properties of a thing, or by that which is represented by a single idea and itself. The concept acquired, that is, is not limited in the way in which its acquisition is limited. Thus, for Locke, there is a distinction to be made between, on the one hand, pairs of ideas of a single thing from which the idea of identity can be acquired-namely, at least some of those in which the pairs represent the thing as possessing properties at different times-and, on the other, pairs from which the idea cannot be acquired, even though the relation holds between the things that the ideas represent. The pair consisting of the idea of the general and the idea of the officer falls into the first class; the general, who has both of these ideas, could use them to acquire the idea of identity. The pair of ideas consisting of the idea of the general and the idea of the general falls into the second; the general is identical to the general, of course, but the person who has those two ideas (the general, for instance)
could not use them, Locke thinks, to acquire the idea of the relation of identity.
Although the relation of identity is there between the general and himself, it is only visible when we consider the relation holding between the general and the officer. Or so, anyway, Locke seems to think.
As is so often the case, where Locke sees a distinction in our ideas, Reid sees a distinction in things themselves. We can think of Reid as distinguishing between what we might call "strict identity" and what we might call "derived identity". Strict identity holds only between things picked out at different times the conceptions of which allow us to recognize-we might even say "to perceive" iv -the identity relation between them. Derived identity holds where the relation of identity can be inferred by appeal to relations of strict identity and other principles like a transitivity principle and a 8 symmetry principle. The officer and the general are strictly identical; in remembering the officer's experience, the general perceives a relation of identity between himself and the officer. From this fact we are able to derive the identity of the general and the general by applying symmetry and transitivity principles. So the general is derivatively identical to the general. To say that A is identical to B without qualifying the word "identical" is to say that either the relation of strict identity or the relation of derived identity hold between A and B. In other words, the ordinary notion of identity is the union of the two relations.
We might think about strict and derived identity through an analogy. Compare the property of red attributed to an object on the basis of a perceptual experience by a normal observer in normal conditions to the property of red attributed to the object by a blind man who uses a meter to measure the wavelength of light emanating from the object and marks it on a chart that correlates wavelength with the perceptual experience of normal observers. Under one point of view, analogous to Locke's, the two properties are the same, although the two observers come to know about them in different ways.
Under another, analogous to Reid's, the two properties are actually different. What the properties are, on the Reidian view, depends on how they are discoverable; the normal observer's red isn't the same as the blind man's red. Such is the case with strict and derived identity. Strict identity is the perceivable identity relation; derived is the inferrable. Reid takes the two relations to be different, just as we might take the two "reds" to be different.
Just as two ideas sometimes can, and sometimes cannot, be used, for Locke, to acquire the idea of identity, sometimes we are and sometimes we are not, for Reid, capable of perceiving, as opposed to inferring, an identity between two things that we individually perceive. When we are so capable, the identity relation is strict. Reid says many times that our own identity is a first principle.
v For Reid what this means is that 9 we are able to perceive the relation of identity between ourselves now and earlier without the aid of any inference. Where there is the possibility of such perceptionawareness without inference-there is the relation of strict identity. By contrast, we need also to use our capacity to reason to recognize a relation of derived identity between two things. This is a functional definition of strict identity: it is a relation that can be directly perceived through the exercise of one of the natural faculties of the human constitution and without the aid of reason.
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The distinction between strict and derived identity is of great importance for understanding Reid's position and his attitude towards Locke's theory of personal identity. Consider the following passage, a passage that I will discuss at some length.
Let's call the argument offered here the "Gap Argument":
(5) I see evidently that identity supposes an uninterrupted continuance of existence. That which hath ceased to exist, cannot be the same with that which afterwards begins to exist; for this would be to suppose a being to exist after it ceased to exist, and to have had existence before it was produced, which are manifest contradictions. Continued uninterrupted existence is therefore necessarily implied in identity.
Hence we may infer, that identity cannot, in it proper sense, be applied to our pains, our pleasures, our thoughts, or any operation of our minds. The pain felt this day is not the same individual pain which I felt yesterday, though they Let's say that A is a thing that exists at one time and B is a thing that exists at another. Reid claims that if A = B, then A (and B) exists at every time between the time at which A exists and the time at which B does. He offers a reductio ad absurdum for this claim that involves considering, as in Figure 1 , the possibility that the thing in question has a gap in its existence. In Figure 1 , we are imagining a universe that has nothing in it except A-the thing that exists at least between t1 and t2-and B-the thing that exists at least between t3 and t4; in this universe, nothing exists between t2 and t3. Reid seems to be claiming that what is described in Figure 1 
Nothing exists from t2 to t3.
What is the obstacle to the possibility of A being identical to B? First, let's try to reconstruct Reid's argument without using the distinction between strict and derivable But, perhaps Reid's argument should be understood differently; perhaps the argument needs to be reconstructed in a way that takes advantage of the distinction between strict and derived identity. Perhaps his point is that a person who is in a position to perceive that A and B are strictly identical-that the relation between them is of the sort that we can perceive without the help of our capacities for rational inference-must presuppose that there is no point in time between A's beginning to exist and B's ceasing to exist at which neither exists. Inferring identity might not require any such presupposition; but perceiving it requires the presupposition that the relata of the relation one is perceiving is not gappy in its existence. But why would this need to be presupposed? The answer probably comes from two things: from the way in which Reid thinks of awareness that something is the case through the exercise of one of the "original faculties of the human constitution" and from the way in which Reid thinks of the subjects of experience, the subjects that are the relata in the perceived relation. I explain.
Reid takes himself to be aware through the exercise of an original faculty of the human constitution of the subject of the succession of his thoughts, the subject that Hume famously searched without success for an impression of. Reid agrees that there is no impression of the subject of one's experiences, but since he does not think that an impression is needed in order to be aware of a thing, he considers that no obstacle to being aware of the subject of his thoughts. Reid writes, (6) The thoughts and feelings of which we are conscious are continually changing, and the thought of this moment is not the thought of the last; but something which I call myself, remains under this change of thought. This self has the same relation to the successive thoughts I am conscious of, they are all 13 my thoughts; and every thought which is not my thought, must be the thought of some other person.
If any man asks a proof of this, I confess I can give none; there is an evidence in the proposition itself which I am unable to resist. (EIP VI.5, pp. 472-
3)
The last remark here involves a familiar Reidian move, invoking the technical notion from the period of a "proof". A "proof" of a proposition increases the epistemic certainty that one has in the proposition by citing other propositions that are of greater epistemic certainty and from which the proven proposition follows. Proofs are contrasted with "demonstrations", which are deductive arguments that may appeal to premises that are no more certain than the conclusion was antecedent of the demonstration. "p, therefore p" is a demonstration-the conclusion follows deductively from the premise-but it is no proof since the premise is exactly as antecedently certain as the conclusion. In claiming that Reid cannot prove that his mind is a subject distinct from all of his thoughts and standing in the same relation to each of them, Reid is asserting that he recognizes this to be so through a faculty of the mind that is distinct from his capacity to recognize reasons for propositions, a faculty that is just as trustworthy as his faculty of reason. That he is such a subject is something of which he is convinced and for which no reason that would increase his certainty can be given.
Whatever mental faculty it is that Reid takes to be exercised in this recognition, it seems likely that it is the same faculty through which we recognize the identity between subjects perceived through the perception of qualities at different times. The general is aware of the subject of the present thoughts, something over and above the thoughts of which he is conscious. He is at the same time also aware of the subject of past thoughts, the thoughts of the officer. And, further, Reid thinks, he is aware that the relation of strict identity holds between the two subjects. He does not infer that the general and the officer are identical by, say, spotting some similarity between the two subjects, or by spotting some third subject that each is identical to. Rather, he simply recognizes without any help from any other mental faculty that there is a relation of identity between the two subjects.
Put another way, if a person recognizes that p through the exercise of a natural faculty unaided by reason, then there is no proof of p possible even in principle for him.
Nothing that could be said in favor of the truth of p would increase his epistemic certainty in it. Now imagine that you recognize that p in this way, but you do not presuppose that q. And, further, imagine that if you had reason to believe that q, then your belief that p would be more certain. And, further, there is reason to believe that q.
This state of affairs, under Reid's view, is flatly impossible for it implies that you recognize something through the exercise of a natural faculty that could be proven; the proof would provide the reasons for q and would show how q's truth makes p more likely to be true. Rather, under Reid's view, if you really recognize that p through the exercise of a natural faculty unaided by reason, then you must presuppose the truth of everything that would give you greater certainty in your belief that p. You might not be aware that you are presupposing these things, but, still, you are presupposing them.
But if you already presuppose these things, being shown their truth would not make you any more certain that p. Now consider the following question: Why does the exercise of the capacity to spot an identity between subjects of experience require a presupposition that the subject is not gappy in its existence? The answer is that in perceiving the identity between subjects of experience, encountered through properties at different times, we must assume that there is no difference between the two subjects that provides any reason to 15 doubt their identity. The subjects cannot differ in some respect that would need to be explained away in order to support the claim of identity. If there was something that needed to be explained and that would give us greater confidence in the judgment of identity, then there would be a proof of the belief in identity available. The proof would involve offering the explanation and thereby raising the degree of certainty of the identity; it would quell the doubt supplied by the difference. Now, if A and B, in Figure 1 , are identical then they both begin to exist at t1 and both cease existing at t4.
The possibility that things are as described in Figure 1 does not show, that is, all by itself, that there is something that the person who asserts A and B to be identical needs to give a reason for denying. However, if things are as described in Figure 1 , then there is a possibility of distinction between A and B that would need to be explained away if identity between A and B is to be asserted. A person who claimed to perceive subject A and subject B, in Figure 1 , and perceived that the two are identical could not also accept that the universe is as described in Figure 1 without providing a reason for his belief that A does not cease existing at t2 and that B does not start existing at t3. After all, if there is a time between t1 and t4 at which nothing exists, then there is the possibility that A is annihilated at t2-genuinely ceases to exist-and there is the possibility that B is born at t3-genuinely starts to exist for the first time at t3. The person who perceives that A and B are identical could defeat these possibilities by citing a reason for thinking that A and B are identical despite the gap; perhaps each is perceived to be identical to some third subject. But then such a person would have to derive the identity between A and B by appeal to that reason, and would not be perceiving it without the help of his capacities for inference. If he is completely certain that A is identical to B then he takes there to be no possibility to defeat and so he presupposes that things are not as described in Figure 1 ; he presupposes that the subject exists continuously. We might worry that because, for all he knows, there is a gap, he cannot be certain that he is really perceiving the identity despite what he thinks. But Reid's response to this would be to accept the contrapositive: because he is certain that there is identity between A and B without giving any reasons for this, he is certain that there is no gap, and so no possibility to defeat with reasons.
It is one thing to say that a proposition is presupposed, another to say that it is true. And so it is one thing to say that perceiving identity between bare subjects involves presupposing continuous existence and another to say that the subject really does continuously exist. However, for reasons invoked in his response to skepticism and idealism, among other places, Reid thinks that presupposed propositions are true when they are presupposed by an exercise of one of the original faculties of the human constitution. Roughly, the argument runs that acceptance of a reason that opposes what one believes must be made on the basis of greater trust in the faculty through which one recognizes that reason than one has in the faculty that gave rise to the belief in the first place. We have just as much reason to trust the faculty through which we come to believe in the existence of the external world as we have to trust the faculty through which we recognize the validity of, say, Berkeley's arguments against material substance, and so, Reid thinks, those arguments lack traction. Similarly, we have just as much reason to trust the faculty through which we perceive the current subject of our experiences to be identical to the past subject of experience, and so just as much reason to trust what we necessarily presuppose in making that judgment as we have to trust the faculty of reason, or any other faculty. What follows is that he holds that where there is strict identity, there are in fact no gaps in existence. The very possibility of true perception of the identity relation-as we have where there is strict identityundermines the possibility of gappy existence.
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The Gap Argument can be reconstructed, then, as follows, where, as before, A is the subject that exists at least from t1 to t2 in Figure 1 , and B is the subject that exists at least from t3 to t4, and where nothing exists from t2 to t3:
1''. It is possible that A ceases to exist at t2 or that B starts to exist at t3, or both. The argument just reconstructed provides Reid with a tool for distinguishing between those entities that enjoy continuous existence and those that exist successively.
If it is possible to perceive the identity between bare subjects considered as the subjects of temporally separated properties, then the subject in question has continued existence.
If, by contrast, perception of identity between entities encountered at different times must be mediated by awareness of something else from which identity is inferred or derived-an awareness, for instance, of similarity between the two entities-then the entity in question could have only successive existence. Reid takes the paradigm instance of a thing with successive existence to be the mental state of pain. There is a sense in which the pain caused by an injury to the knee, experienced last night, and the pain from the same injury experienced this morning are perceived by me to be the same pain, despite the fact that, given that I was unconscious through the night and so felt no pain at all, it was gappy in its existence. However, in perceiving the identity between the two pains, I am not aware of two bare subjects and aware of the identity relation between them. Rather, I infer that the pains are derivatively identical from the fact that they have the same cause and feel the same. As Reid says in passage (5), strictly speaking, the pains are distinct from one another. That is, the relation of strict identity-the relation that can be perceived through an exercise of one of our natural faculties-does not hold between the pain encountered last night and the pain encountered this morning. So it is, Reid thinks, with all our mental states. This is not to say that mental states do not stand in identity relations. That's not true. They stand in derived identity relations. What this implies is that there is such a thing as a single pain that exists over a long temporal interval. What that single thing is is a single sequence of strictly distinct pains. Each of the things in the sequence is distinct from the others in the sense of strict identity. But there may, nonetheless, be relations between them-such as similarity and common cause-that makes it the case that the sequence is a single thing, a single pain, in the sense of derived identity. Such a single thing has successive existence, not continuous, and could have a gappy existence.
It is important to see that Reid is not committed to the clearly false claim that a successively existing thing necessarily is gappy in its existence. It would be possible to feel a pain for a full hour without end. What Reid is committed to is that a gap in the existence of a successively existing thing is perfectly compatible with our judgments of identity between successively existing things encountered at different times (so long as it is understood that these are not judgments of strict identity, but of derived). This contrasts with the case of bare subjects where our judgments of identity (strict in this case) necessarily presuppose the absence of such gaps. What follows is that there is no reason to take the pain that I feel for an hour without a break to be a bare subject, strictly identical to itself, and existing for that hour. My judgment of identity-made, say, between the pain of the first fifteen minutes and the pain of the last-is compatible with there being, strictly speaking, a different pain each and every moment over the course of the interval where none of the pains in the succession is, itself, a subject possessing properties.
Notice, however, that Reid does not conclude that pains could either exist continuously or successively, while bare subjects can exist only continuously. Rather, he concludes that pains and other mental states exist only successively. The reason that
Reid jumps in this way is that, in the wake of Locke's, Hume's and Berkeley's attacks on the very idea of substances and bare substrata, he takes himself to be in position to assert the existence of a continuously existing subject only when there is no other way to explain our judgments of identity. In the case of pains and other mental states, we can explain the jugments of identity through appeal only to (sometimes densely packed) successive existences and do not need to appeal to continuously existing things.
Not so when it comes to our judgments of our own identity over time.
The distinction between continuous existence and successive existence, and the companion distinction between strict and derived identity, mark a distinction between true unity and its absence. If we assume, as is plausible, that a thing with temporal parts possesses none of them essentially, then strictly identical things are true unities for they lack even temporal parts. Someone who perceives a strict identity between the bare subjects of temporally separated properties presupposes not just that the thing is 20 not in fact gappy in its existence, but that it couldn't possibly be. If it could be, then the person would have to have some reason to believe that possibility to be unrealized in order to be certain that he is perceiving identity; since he is certain that he is perceiving an identity, he presupposes the impossibility of the thing being gappy. But every thing with temporal parts could be gappy in its existence, even if it is not in fact. It would be possible for it to lose one of its temporal parts without thereby being destroyed. So strictly identical things necessarily lack temporal parts. By contrast, successively existing things necessarily possess temporal parts. What this implies is that if it can be shown that persons lack parts, it can be shown that they are continuously existing bare subjects that are strictly identical to themselves, Reid thinks. Why does Reid believe that persons are partless? As we'll see in the next section, answering this question exhibits the nature of the link that Reid sees between the metaphysics of identity and the ethical evaluation of persons.
Partless Persons and the Moral Sense
To start, consider the following passage: ruled out by the nature of strict identity, which is a relation that is by its nature perceivable through the exercise of one of one's native, natural faculties and without the help of reason. But to accept that a person has parts is to accept something that could be true, but which our native natural faculties tell us is false. Reid's appeal to the indivisibility of entitlement, debt, merit and demerit is intended to help us to see that we presuppose the partlessness of person when making certain ordinary moral judgments. These judgments are exercises of a natural faculty: the moral sense or the faculty of conscience. Reid's point is that when that faculty is working correctly its dictates presuppose the partlessness of persons.
This claim needs to be evaluated-it is far from obviously true that ordinary moral judgments of persons presuppose their partlessness-and we'll take a few steps towards evaluating it in a moment. But first it is important to see that the point serves to unite two strands in Reid's thought. The first strand, which has been examined to 22 some degree already in this paper, concerns the lesson that can be drawn from the fact (or, in any event, what Reid takes to be a fact) of the special nature of first-personal awareness of one's own identity. From the inside, as it were, there is often no inference to be made, and no room for doubt about the possibility that the subject of one's present experiences is identical to the subject of some past ones. The judgment that there is identity here is a deliverance of a natural faculty of the human constitution. And from this fact each person is able to conclude, Reid thinks, that the subject of his experiences is a continuously existing thing and not a successively existing one.
The second strand of thought concerns the link that Reid evidently sees, as did many in the period, between the moral sense, which is exercised both in the evaluation of ourselves and of others, and conscience, which is exercised only in the evaluation of ourselves. In fact, the link for Reid is so strong that he uses the two notions interchangably. viii Still, there is a distinction here even if Reid does not accept it: strictly speaking, one's conscience is always self-directed-it takes as its object one's own actions, character traits, emotional responses and perhaps more besides, but only things that are one's own. The negative dictates of conscience-we might say the pangs of conscience, so long as we are careful not to take that phrase to imply that the emotional feeling exhausts the exercise of the faculty-involve a judgment to the effect that one has fallen short, in some respect, of one's very own standards. In equating conscience and the moral sense, Reid seems to be holding that to judge of the moral qualities of another is to get as close as one can to taking the first-personal perspective towards someone else. Literally speaking, this is impossible: to take the first-personal perspective on something is to conceive of it as identical to, or part of, oneself, and so that perspective cannot be directed to something one recognizes to be entirely distinct from oneself. But, still, the idea is that in making a moral judgment of another, such as a judgment to the effect that another's action was wrong, it is as if one is saying, "If I 23 were you, my conscience would disapprove of that act." Moral attitudes concerning others, including judgments, are the dictates of the faculty of conscience directed towards others.
Combining these two strands of thought in Reid, we reach the following idea:
Conscience, when directed at oneself, involves awareness of strict identity between the subject of the act, attitude or character trait being evaluated and the subject of the dictate of conscience ix ; similarly, conscience, when directed at another, involves not the awareness but the presupposition of the same strict identity between the subject on whom the sentence, as it were, is being passed, and the subject of the act, attitude or character trait for which the sentence is being passed. The idea is that what we are aware of when we judge ourselves-namely that there is strict identity-is a presupposition of the exercise of the same faculty when directed at another. Put more simply, if it is true that "If I were you, my conscience would disapprove of that act" it must also be true that the subject being criticized is in a position to spot the strict identity between himself and the subject, the agent, of the act. Since A must have continuous existence to be rightly judged by A's conscience-a fact of which A is aware when exercising his conscience-B must also have continuous existence to be rightly judged by A's moral sense. If, for instance, A exercises his moral sense to perceive that the defendant in the courtroom has the objectionable moral quality of the one who committed the crime, then A thereby presupposes that the defendant could be noninferentially aware of the identity between himself and the man who committed the crime.
What has just been reconstructed is a way of reaching the conclusion that persons are partless, that they have continuous and not successive existence, from the premise that to judge of another is to employ the very same faculty, the faculty of conscience, that one employs when judging oneself. The reconstruction connects two 24 things that Reid accepts, but it is a speculative reconstruction, for there is no evidence I know of that Reid made the connection himself explicitly in this way. Now the premise that judgements of another involve the same faculty that one employs in judging of oneself is plausible enough. But is there more than intuition that would lead us to accept it? Is there something about moral judgment of others, itself, that suggests this deep kinship? There very well may be. A place to start is reflection on the idea that to hold another morally responsible-in contrast, for instance, to holding him merely causally responsible-is to see him as violating standards that, in some sense, are his own standards. The words "in some sense" in this formulation serve as a patch over an area of darkness, for it is quite clear that we often hold people responsible for behavior that they thought, explicitly anyway, to be perfectly acceptable. Be that as it may, there is truth in the idea, and it is part of what motivates the thought that animals are never to be judged morally, even if they are to be judged as, for instance, dangerous. Moral judgment involves a presumption of capacity for the appreciation of the very standards with respect to which the judged is taken to fall short, a capacity that animals seem to lack. It is quite possible that this is the seed from which grows Reid's conception of the moral sense, when directed at others, as involving a presupposition about persons that we find explicitly confirmed, he thinks, in the experience of ourselves that is implicated in self-directed deliverances of conscience.
Reid's Brave Officer
We're now in position to appreciate the lesson that Reid wants us to take from the Brave Officer example. Whatever precisely Locke's theory of personal identity ishowever we are to understand the idea that identity between the subjects of temporally Start by considering Reid's claim in passage (2) that the Boy and the General are the same person. Say I look at object A and then at object B. I also touch object B and then object C. I never touch A and I never look at C. A and B are in the same sequence-the sequence of objects I looked at. B and C are in the same sequence-the sequence of objects I touched. But A and C are not both in either sequence. They might be in some third sequence, but they are not in whatever sequence they both belong to in virtue of the fact that each is in a sequence with object B. Is this a violation of transitivity? Not really. When I say, "A and B are in the same sequence" I mean something different by the term "same sequence" than when I say, "B and C are in the same sequence". Still, the example illustrates something important. If a thing has successive existence, then its parts are things that are capable of being members of distinct sequences, or distinct things that also exist successively. Two distinct successive existences could overlap in parts. By contrast, something that has continuous existence, necessarily lacks parts that could be parts of other things. The very idea of overlap requires a region of overlap that could be meaningfully considered in insolation from the thing of which it is a part. But continuously existing things necessarily lack such parts and so necessarily do not overlap partially with anything else.
Now, look at the first half of passage (2) sequences that share a common part, namely the Officer. If we were dealing with a successively existing thing, we could no more conclude that the Boy and the General are parts of the same sequence than we can conclude that the object I looked at without touching and the object I touched without looking at are parts of the same sequence since each is in sequence with something I both looked at and touched. Rather, we are able to reach the conclusion that the Boy and the General are the same person by thinking of the Boy and the Officer as the same continuously existing thing, and by thinking of the Officer and the General that way. We can reach the conclusion that the Boy and the General are the same person if there is truth in logic-if, that is, there is something about the nature of the objects in play, namely that they are continuously existing things, that licenses unguarded appeal to the principle of transitivity. Put another way, the principle of transitivity is not a principle of formal logic, but a principle that is true of certain types of objects, namely those enjoying continuous and not successive existence. So, in drawing the conclusion that the Boy and the General are the same person, Reid is noticing that this very ordinary judgment is supported by a supposition to the effect that persons are continuously existing things.
Now consider the second conclusion that Reid reaches: namely, that the Boy and the General are not the same person. This conclusion is reached on the strength of the fact that the General does not remember the Boy's experience. However, if we were talking about the identity of a continuously existing thing, we could not reach this conclusion on this basis. After all, in perceiving the identity between himself and the Officer, the General presupposes that the Officer exists continuously from the moment the enemy flag is taken to the moment that he sits in the nursing home. But it is not the case that he remembers all of those intervening moments. Mere absence of awareness of the experience of a time does not show that there is not identity between the subject of that experience and one's self, assuming the subject is a continuously existing thing.
On the other hand, there is good reason to think that the Boy's thoughts are not parts of Would the objection that I take the Brave Officer example to illustrate still apply to such a theory? Yes. The reason is that although under such a theory we could still infer, for instance, that the Boy and the General are identical without the assumption that they are continuously existing things it would not be the nature of the entities involved that licensed that inference. We would reach the conclusion that they are identical by using the theory of personal identity-the theory that specifies the law of the series of which their thoughts are both elements-as a premise. The thoughts of the Boy and the thoughts of the General are the sorts of things that fit into many different sorts of sequences. To insist that the relevant sequence is the one under which they are elements in the same sequence is to appeal to something extrinsic to the nature of the entities involved. Or, to put the point another way, it is nothing about the nature of thoughts, or the nature of successively existing things, that dictates the law of the series specified by such a theory of personal identity, the law which maintains transitivity. By contrast, the transitivity principle is implicated by the very nature of continuously existing things. So, to alter a Lockean theory of personal identity by altering the law of the series of thoughts that the theory insists to be constitutive of personal identity and thereby to take the features of a successively existing thing to be constitutive of the features of a continuously existing is to fail to respond to the objection that Reid is offering with the Brave Officer example. This is so, even if the proposed Lockean theory of personal identity licenses all the inferences that are licensed by the fact that a thing exists continuously.
Conclusion
There is a well-known tradition, of which Locke is a part, of claiming that the unity of the mind is in some way linked to, or even a product of "consciousness", however that is to be understood. Despite the fact that Reid objects to Locke's theory of personal identity, and does so on the grounds that it cannot account for the unity of the mind, Reid, too, is firmly in this tradition. We can see this by reflecting a bit further on the notion of strict identity: identity perceivable through a natural faculty of the human mind and without the aid of other faculties such as the faculty of reason.
To have what Reid calls a "conception" of a thing-such as a property of an object, or the subject of that property, or a relation between objects-is to be aware of the thing. Such awareness does not involve, as it does on the theory of ideas, an apprehension of a mental representation of the thing. Whatever apprehension of an idea, under the theory of ideas, is supposed to be, the conception of a thing, for Reid, involves that same form of apprehension. Just as we are directly aware of our ideas, under the theory of ideas, we are directly aware of things, on Reid's theory. To recognize a strict identity relation between the subject of one's present experiences and the subject of certain past experiences is to have a thought, a thought the immediate object of which is the relation of strict identity. Further it is from the nature of that thought-that it involves an irresistible conviction that there is but one subject there, and that it springs from an original principle of the human constitution-that we are able to conclude that where there is that thought there is but a single subject of experience. The nature of the thought justifies our reliance on it. So it is under the tradition that sees the unity of the mind as deriving from the unity of consciousness.
On all such views, it is something about the act of reflective awareness of the mind that justifies the assertion of the mind's unity. The difference, of course, between Reid's view and Locke's, anyway, if not others in this tradition, is that, for Reid, the fact of identity, discovered by the perception of identity, is not constituted by the discovery of it. In fact, thinks Reid, it is precisely because he fails to see this that Locke's theory fails.
A failure that, I've suggested, is illustrated by the Brave Officer example.
i See EIP III.6, p. 276.
ii See Alciphron in Berkeley 1948-57, v. 3: p. 299. iii See MS 2131/6/III/5, 2. This is cited in EIP, p. 276 n. 10.
iv I'll refer to the kind of awareness that we sometimes have of a strict identity relation as one of "perception". Reid uses the term "perception" to refer to an awareness of a thing prompted by a sensory experience of a thing and coupled with a conviction in the existence of the thing of which one is aware. So, strictly speaking, the awareness that one has of a strict identity relation is not one of perception since it is not prompted by any sensory experience. However, as we will see, such awareness involves a conviction in the existence of the relation of which one is aware and behaves in other words just as
Reidian perception behaves.
v See, for instance, EIP VI.5, p. 472.
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vi The assumption inherited from Locke according to which it is easier, rather than harder, to spot identity diachronically than synchronically, commits Reid to the view that it requires inference to recognize one's identity to oneself now, while one's identity to a person of some moments ago can be recognized non-inferentially. To some this seems peculiar. To me it seems quite natural. A child knows that she is the same person who moments ago dived into the pool, but she needs to be taught that, in the moment she is puffed up with pride she is the same person who, at that moment, is puffed up with pride. The recognition of synchronic identity requires a grasp of the concept of identity that the recognition of diachronic identity does not always require.
vii Another similar passage:
The identity of a person is a perfect identity; wherever it is real, it admits of no degrees; and it is impossible that a person should be in part the same, and in part different; because a person is a monad, and is not divisible into parts. (EIP III.4, p.
265)
viii See, for instance, EAP III.6, p. 231.
ix It thus might be no surprise that in the period, although not by Reid, the word "conscience" and the word "consciousness" were sometimes interchanged.
